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The involuntary sterilisation of HIV-positive women in South Africa 
(SA) is not a fiction found in medical horror stories, but a tragic 
reality of perpetual stigmatisation of the most vulnerable in society. 
Involuntary sterilisation is imposed on HIV-positive women to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of HIV. There is both a lack of 
information on this violation, and a lack of recourse for its victims. 
First-hand accounts provide evidence that this is a fearful reality which 
HIV-positive women are exposed to in exercising their reproductive 
health rights.[1] Involuntary sterilisation has grave consequences 
for women physically, emotionally, socially and culturally. It also 
violates women’s enjoyment of their reproductive health rights, as 
McLaughlin[2] notes:
 ‘Sterilisation procedures should be voluntary medical surgeries 
due to the general irreversible nature of sterilisation, which leaves 
a lasting change on one’s bodily functions and capabilities to 
exercise one’s right to reproduce.’
This argument emphasises the reasons that sterilisation is a 
procedure that requires informed consent. HIV-positive women 
who are involuntarily sterilised are subjected to a usually permanent 
change in their body, and subsequently, their reproductive health 
rights. Involuntary sterilisation is inherently discriminatory, as the 
motivating reason behind this practice is ‘to deny specific populations 
the ability to procreate due to a perception that they are less than 
ideal members of society.’[3] If this occurs based on a woman’s HIV 
status, it further amounts to discrimination. The crux of the problem 
with this practice is therefore informed consent, and discrimination 
on the grounds of HIV status.
This article seeks to examine this practice from an SA legal 
perspective. Firstly, the issue will be contextualised to explain why 
it happens, and the effects thereof. The constitutional and legal 
framework will then be examined to understand which rights and 
laws are implicated under SA law. The two focal issues, informed 
consent and discrimination, will then be examined in light of the legal 
framework and context provided. This article seeks to examine the 
issues from a legal perspective and consider possible ways forward.
Placing the issue in context
HIV-positive women are being involuntarily sterilised to limit the 
transmission of HIV from mother to child.[4] The rationale behind this 
practice provided by healthcare workers is four-fold.[5] Firstly, the HIV 
status and socioeconomic circumstances of the women are deemed 
to influence the healthcare workers as to the women’s suitability to 
bear more children.[5] Secondly, healthcare workers see sterilisation as 
a means to prevent children being born HIV-positive.[5] Thirdly, owing 
to the influence that HIV can have on a person’s life expectancy, some 
healthcare workers believe that this practice avoids children being 
left motherless or orphaned.[5] Lastly, it is argued that HIV-positive 
women should not expose themselves to harm by carrying a child.[5] 
These rationales are based on misconceptions. They do not give 
due credit to the effectiveness of antiretrovirals and medicine in 
preventing MTCT of HIV.[5] These reasons reflect the social context 
facing HIV-positive women wishing to exercise their reproductive 
health rights. The social conception of HIV transmission creates a 
bias against women, as our patriarchal society sees the man as the 
victim of women’s promiscuity.[4] Those living with HIV are viewed 
as having fault in some way, and the fear, ignorance and denial 
accompanying the prevalence of HIV only adds to the stigmatisation 
of HIV-positive persons.[4] This leaves HIV-positive persons, especially 
women, especially vulnerable.
Adding to the vulnerability and stigmatisation imposed by their 
HIV-status, women are also subjected to stigma regarding their 
fertility. Generally, and especially in Africa, a woman’s ability to 
bear children is perceived to be her ‘role, purpose and identity’.[4] 
Consequently, the inability to bear children is seen as a failure of 
social expectations, and has actually been described as ‘the greatest 
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calamity that can befall any society’.[4] Various SA cultural values place 
importance on children and family.[4] A study[6] on the reproductive 
intentions of HIV-positive persons noted:[6]
 ‘Cultural values placed on women’s fertility assign significant social 
status to women who bear children, and childlessness often carries 
negative social consequences.’
The social, cultural and gendered pressure on women to bear 
children inevitably implicates their self-worth and dignity.[7] A lack of 
children or inability to bear children further stigmatises women.[4] It is 
thus that HIV-positive women who are sterilised face a double-edged 
sword of stigmatisation. A vicious cycle of stigmatisation is created 
wherein HIV-positive women are subjected to prejudicial treatment 
from healthcare workers, which sometimes results in the involuntary 
sterilisation of women, and then, women face further social and 
cultural vulnerability as a result of their inability to bear children. This 
necessarily implicates the rights of these women. The constitutional 
and legal framework will now be considered in light of this context.
Constitutional and legal framework
Section 27(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of SA, 1996 provides 
everyone with the right of access to healthcare, including reproductive 
healthcare. Section 12 of the Constitution provides rights regarding 
the freedom and security of the person. Section 12(2) states:
 ‘Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which 
includes the right:
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction;
(b) to security in and control over their body; and
(c)  not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without 
their informed consent.’
Section 12 is fundamental to the issue of involuntary sterilisation, as 
it recognises both reproductive health rights and informed consent. 
Section 9 of the Constitution provides for the right to equality, and 
lists grounds upon which people may not be discriminated against. 
HIV is not a listed ground under section 9, but has been recognised 
by the SA Constitutional Court as an analogous ground, as will 
be examined below. As such, HIV-positive women’s reproductive 
autonomy is protected by various constitutional provisions.
Furthermore, legislation has been enacted to give effect to section 
9 of the Constitution: the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act No. 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA). PEPUDA recognises 
that discrimination can be systemic in nature, and that there is a 
need to address the patriarchal society prevalent in SA – both these 
aspects of discrimination are relevant to the examination of the issue 
of involuntary sterilisation. The preamble of PEPUDA states:
 ‘The consolidation of democracy in our country requires the 
eradication of social and economic inequalities, especially those 
that are systemic in nature, which were generated in our history by 
colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy, and which brought pain and 
suffering to the great majority of our people.’
PEPUDA places an emphasis on consent in healthcare services in its 
Illustrative List of Unfair Practices in Certain Sectors. In holding that 
neither the state nor individuals may unfairly discriminate against any 
person, PEPUDA defines discrimination as:
 ‘any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition 
or situation which directly or indirectly: 
(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantages on; or
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from,
any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds.’
Other legislation also contributes to the framework. Section 6 of 
the National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 (NHA) provides that the 
patient must have full knowledge of their health status, all the 
possible diagnostic procedures, the risks and benefits of each and 
the right to refuse treatment. Section 7 of the NHA further provides 
the requirement that patients must consent to treatment, and that 
healthcare workers must take steps to obtain informed consent from 
the patient.
The Sterilisation Act No. 44 of 1998 recognises the constitutional 
rights referred to above. The Sterilisation Act deals with instances 
where consent cannot be obtained owing to the impaired capacity of 
the patient, and other regulations regarding sterilisation procedures. 
Section 4 elaborates on the requirement for consent:
 ‘“[C]onsent” means consent given freely and voluntarily without 
any inducement and may only be given if the person giving it has
(a) been given a clear explanation and adequate description of the
(i) proposed plan of the procedure; and
(ii)  consequences, risks and the reversible or irreversible 
nature of the sterilisation procedure;
(b)  been given advice that the consent may be withdrawn any time 
before the treatment; and
(c)  signed the prescribed consent form.’
In addition to involuntary sterilisation violating health rights, the right 
to freedom and security of the person and the right to equality and 
non-discrimination, it also impedes on the right to information, under 
section 32 of the Constitution. The right to access to information 
includes the right to any information necessary to protect your rights, 
such as reproductive health rights. 
This illustrates the nature of SA’s constitutional rights related to 
informed consent. However, there is a great disparity between this 
detailed understanding of consent and the circumstances under 
which it must be obtained (that of an informed patient), and the 
practical execution of obtaining consent for sterilisation, especially in 
cases of HIV-positive women. The examination now turns to the issue 
of consent, as informed by the legal framework and context.
The issue of consent
While there have been official reports of women in SA being 
involuntarily sterilised, there has not yet been a case on this issue. 
As such, there is a need to rely on neighbouring jurisprudence. It 
is justifiable to do so, as the circumstances and issues of the case 
are similar to the issues faced in the SA context, and can therefore 
provide an illustrative example of jurisprudence on this issue. 
The Namibian case of LM v Government of the Republic  of 
Namibia[8] focused on the issue of coerced sterilisation and dis-
crimination on the grounds of HIV status. Regarding coercion, the 
issue of consent was raised by the facts. Three women, all HIV-positive 
and pregnant, were already in labour when ‘consent’ was obtained. 
LM had been in labour for over 14 hours when she was given the 
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consent form to sign on a stretcher outside the theatre (prior to a 
caesarean section). Similarly, MI had been in labour for hours when 
she, according to her testimony, was told, not asked, to sign the 
consent form. In all three circumstances, there was no evidence to 
suggest that the women had been properly informed. 
SA law on informed consent is based on the doctrine of volenti 
non fit injuria (‘to a willing person, injury is not done’).[9] The legal 
requirements are contained in the NHA, as examined above. In case 
law, the locus classicus is Castell v De Greef,[10] where an operation 
performed by a plastic surgeon on the plaintiff’s breasts resulted in 
complications that the patient had not been informed of prior to 
surgery. Furthermore, the patient argued that she would not have 
consented to the procedure had she been aware of this risk. Justice 
Ackermann laid out the requirements for informed consent as follows 
(paragraph 80):[10]
(a)  The consenting party ‘must have had knowledge and been 
aware of the nature and extent of the harm or risk’; 
(b)  The consenting party ‘must have appreciated and understood 
the nature and extent of the risk’;
(c)  The consenting party ‘must have consented to the harm or 
assumed the risk’;
(d)  The consent ‘must be comprehensive, that is extend to the 
entire transaction, inclusive of its consequences’
While the present article is not concerned with risk, but rather 
with the direct result of a medical procedure (sterilisation), the last 
requirement is of particular relevance. This requirement indicates that 
a patient must be aware of and appreciate the nature and extent of 
the procedure, and must consent to the consequences. Involuntary 
sterilisation, or sterilisation performed under the pseudo-consent 
illustrated by LM, does not meet this requirement. Informed consent, 
as provided for in the Constitution, legislation and the common law, 
is, as put by Barit:[9]
 ‘part of the shift in medicine from a paternalistic environment to 
one in which patients have control over their own bodies and the 
right to make decisions about what happens to it.’ 
Informed consent is fundamental to a person’s reproductive 
autonomy.[11] This autonomy exists even when others disagree with 
the individual’s choices, and it is explicitly protected in law.[11]
The World Health Organization has elaborated on the information 
required for informed consent regarding sterilisation procedures.[12] 
The patient must know that sterilisation is a surgical procedure with 
both risks and benefits. The patient must be informed of whether 
or not the procedure is permanent, and the likelihood of future 
pregnancies. The patient must understand that refusing to undergo 
the sterilisation procedure will not be to the detriment of their health. 
The patient must also be informed of other forms of contraception or 
sterilisation available. In light of this understanding, a patient cannot 
be denied other healthcare treatment if she refuses to consent to 
sterilisation, nor can a patient be threatened that she will not receive 
certain care if she does not consent.[12] First-hand accounts indicate 
that some women are in fact told that they will not receive maternal 
care or HIV treatment if they do not consent to sterilisation.[1]
Obtaining consent is influenced by the power imbalance which 
exists between the patient and the healthcare worker, and this 
power imbalance may further be gendered. As observed by Mamad, 
such power imbalances may result in the patient’s choices ‘being 
determined by the health workers’ perceptions, preferences and 
values, consciously or unconsciously.’[4] The International Community 
of Women comments on the effect of this power imbalance:[7]
 ‘Gender inequalities and unequal power dynamics inherent within 
societies around the world – and particularly in the provision of 
healthcare services – make it challenging for women to assert their 
reproductive rights, and ultimately, to have their autonomy and 
decision-making respected.’
As explained above, HIV-positive women are stigmatised and this 
social discernment inevitably influences the healthcare workers’ 
perception, which is then directly or indirectly imposed on the 
patient. The information provided to a patient on which informed 
consent is to be based can also be influenced by the healthcare 
workers’ perceptions.
Badul and Strode[5] see consent as a process, and not an outcome. 
There must be an engagement between the patient and the doctor 
that is informative, and not subject to prejudicial influences. The mere 
signing of a form does not amount to consent, as was highlighted in 
the LM case. Obtaining consent is not merely a procedural anomaly 
that can be imposed on a patient at a healthcare worker’s discretion. 
It is subsequently necessary to consider whether healthcare workers 
impose their perceptions on these women because of their HIV status, 
and if so, whether this amounts to discrimination (although it may be 
argued that involuntary sterilisation is inherently discriminatory, as 
noted above).
The issue of discrimination
Section 9 of the Constitution protects against unfair discrimination. 
The test for determining whether law or conduct amounts to unfair 
discrimination was developed in Harksen v Lane.[13] The test is twofold. 
Firstly, it must be determined whether the law or conduct at issue 
differentiates between persons (paragraph 53).[13] In the affirmative, it 
must be determined if the differentiation bears a rational connection 
to a legitimate government purpose. The second leg of the test 
considers whether the differentiation amounts to discrimination, 
and then whether the discrimination is fair. If the differentiation is on 
a ground listed in section 9 of the Constitution, then it amounts to 
discrimination. If it is not on a listed ground, then it will depend on 
the differentiation’s potential to impair the human dignity of persons. 
Discrimination is presumed to be unfair if it is on a listed ground 
under section 9 of the Constitution. To determine unfairness on non-
listed grounds, the impact of the discrimination is considered.
HIV status is not a listed ground. However, the Constitutional Court 
has held that it amounts to an analogous ground, as discrimination 
on the basis of a person’s HIV status impacts negatively on a person’s 
dignity and it is based on an ‘ill-informed prejudice’.[14] Discrimination 
based on a person’s HIV status was the issue in Hoffman v SAA.[14] The 
airline’s employment policy was not to hire any HIV-positive persons 
as cabin attendants. The Court held that this policy was not justified 
because some people living with HIV would not be able to work as 
cabin attendants. In highlighting the ‘prevailing prejudice’ against 
HIV-positive people, the Court held that unfair discrimination can 
never be justified by prejudice.
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Looking at the issue of involuntary sterilisation of HIV-positive 
women, the conduct does differentiate between people based on 
their HIV status. In determining whether such differentiation amounts 
to discrimination, although it is not a listed ground, the Court has 
clearly recognised HIV status as an analogous ground owing to its 
impairment of the human dignity of persons. Prejudice towards 
and stigmatisation of HIV-positive persons cannot justify unfair 
discrimination. The impact the conduct has on the victims renders 
this discrimination unfair. Victims in this regard are exposed to further 
stigmatisation socially and culturally. Their self-worth, autonomy and 
ultimately their human dignity, is violated by the disregard for their 
reproductive autonomy and the purpose of informed consent. 
It would be difficult to justify this discrimination. Section 36 of 
the Constitution provides for the limitation of rights if it would be 
‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom’. Section 36 provides that the 
following factors need to be considered when looking to justify the 
limitation of a right:
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
Regarding the practice of involuntary sterilisation of HIV-positive 
women, these factors raise many concerns due to the misinformed 
purpose of the limitation, the extent of the limitation and the fact 
that there are less restrictive means of contraception and prevention 
of MTCT of HIV. Thus, this practice amounts to unfair discrimination 
that cannot be justified.
Additionally, as required by the doctrine of subsidiarity, PEPUDA 
would have to be utilised before relying on section 9 of the Constitution 
directly. Elaborating on the Constitutional provisions, section 14 of 
PEPUDA requires the context to be considered, a set of factors, and 
‘whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates 
between persons according to objectively determinable criteria, 
intrinsic to the activity concerned.’ The factors to be considered under 
section 14(3) include:
(a)  whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human 
dignity;
(b)  the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the 
complainant;
(c)  the position of the complainant in society and whether he or 
she suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group 
that suffers from such patterns of disadvantage;
(d)  the nature and extent of the discrimination;
(e) whether the discrimination is systemic in nature;
(f ) whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose;
(g)  whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its 
purpose;
(h)  whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous 
means to achieve the purpose;
(i)  whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such 
steps as being reasonable in the circumstances to:
(ii)  address the disadvantage that arises from or is related to 
one or more of the prohibited grounds; or
(iii) accommodate diversity.
In light of the context of the issue of involuntary sterilisation, these 
factors further impose a heavy burden on a respondent to justify the 
practice of involuntary sterilisation. Involuntary sterilisation certainly 
has an impact on human dignity, and has a complexity of effects on the 
victim, as illustrated in the contextual discussion above. The practice 
of involuntary sterilisation disproportionately affects HIV-positive 
black African women, who have been, and are still, subject to multiple 
forms of oppression and disadvantage in SA. PEPUDA requires that 
it be considered whether the discrimination is systemic in nature. 
Given SA’s racially discriminatory past, the patriarchal society that 
persists, and the stigma around HIV, involuntary sterilisation in SA is 
necessarily systemic in nature. This is arguably so because the racial 
and gendered prejudices, coupled with the stigma of HIV, and even 
economic status, influence the healthcare workers performing this 
procedure. These prejudices have become entrenched in society.[3] The 
latter factors in section 14(3) reflect those considered under section 36 
of the Constitution.
Considering the systemic and institutionalised nature of the 
prejudice and stigmatisation that inform this unfair discrimination, 
Parker and Aggleton[15] argue that power and domination play a role 
in the structural dimensions of discrimination. They hold that:[15,19]
 ‘Focusing on the relations between culture, power and difference in 
the determination of stigmatisation encourages an understanding 
of HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation and discrimination as 
part of the political economy of social exclusion present in the 
contemporary world.’
Considering such relationships provides a better understanding 
of such stigmatisation, and its consequences. It results in a further 
loss of power, and greater social exclusion. The prejudice acted on 
by healthcare providers, who are in a position of power, further 
undermines the woman’s autonomy. Consequently, HIV is then 
conceptually linked to a woman’s lack of child-bearing ability, and 
consequently her social and self-worth. A relationship between these 
two stigmatised statuses (HIV-positive and sterile) is created by the 
discriminatory practice without regarding a woman’s reproductive 
autonomy, which should not be dependent on the opinion of others, 
albeit healthcare professionals.[11]
This practice also amounts to more than medical negligence or 
malpractice, owing to the systemic stigmatisation of HIV-positive 
persons. It is not an individual assessment, but a generalisation about 
HIV-positive persons and their reproductive decisions. The prejudice 
causing this discriminatory practice cannot justify it. Healthcare 
providers cannot rely on their ill-informed perceptions about and 
prejudices against HIV-positive women to justify the practice of 
involuntary sterilisation. Considering the discussion of informed 
consent above, perceptions and prejudices can also not justify the 
violation of this requirement to obtain informed consent.
Conclusion
The legal frameworks of consent and discrimination have been 
examined in the context of the involuntary sterilisation of HIV-
positive women. From the contextual examination and the legal 
framework, it is evident that this practice occurs as a result of 
entrenched prejudice, a lack of understanding of medical advances 
in antiretrovirals, in the medical advances reducing the prevalence 
of HIV, and of the law regarding the obtaining of consent. This 
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amalgamates into a practice of multidimensional discrimination, and 
results in subjecting the victims to further prejudice on the basis of 
their sterility. The stigmatisation and misconceptions regarding the 
reproductive autonomy of HIV-positive women overshadow the 
medical evidence and fundamental rights of these women. 
Owing to the intersectional discrimination – individual, systemic 
and institutional – on various grounds – race, gender, HIV status, 
socioeconomic status – there is a need for a strong non-discriminatory 
approach to be taken in addressing this practice. As Patel argues:
 ‘Once a court finds that the sterilisation is due to discriminatory 
practices, it can change the issue from one of a few bad incidents 
to one requiring structural reform.’[3]
Such ‘structural reform’ includes addressing the broader systemic 
issues underlying the discrimination. A report by the Human Sciences 
Research Council released at the 2015 SA AIDS Conference on HIV 
Stigma found that out of 6 719 HIV-positive women interviewed, 
498 had been involuntarily sterilised.[16] This shocking number of 
instances (which are still only the cases that are known) indicates that 
this is not merely an issue of individual discrimination and prejudice, 
but one with systemic and structural roots. There is therefore a 
need to address the issue through structural reform. Research is 
needed on how this can be done, perhaps through education and 
empowerment initiatives, but at the same time, litigation on this issue 
can add value in initiating reform initiatives.
This article has argued that the practice of involuntary sterilisation 
goes beyond the notions of medical malpractice or negligence, 
and actually amounts to a systemic problem of HIV stigmatisation, 
especially regarding reproductive health rights. To address such 
a systemic, seemingly engrained prejudice, radical and gendered 
redress needs to be available to the victims, and harsh consequences 
for those enabling this practice. Recourse and punishment is, however, 
not enough. Attention needs to be paid to educating women on 
their reproductive health rights and reproductive autonomy, so 
that they are empowered to explicitly refuse to consent, if they 
wish to do so. Educating women on their rights, as well as on 
consent and the consequences of sterilisation, can help break the 
cycle of stigmatisation, and allow for the enforcement of rights. 
Moreover, and perhaps more urgently, healthcare practitioners need 
to be thoroughly informed about the realities of HIV and the 
rights of the patient. This needs to be done in such a way that 
practitioners appreciate that their personal opinion cannot trump a 
woman’s reproductive autonomy and the requirement for consent. 
Understanding consent as a process is fundamental to this. The 
power imbalance makes the systemic problem difficult to address. 
Nonetheless, increased attention needs to be paid to rights education 
and the way in which consent is obtained. HIV-positive women’s 
reproductive futures being subjected to the prejudices of ill-informed 
healthcare practitioners results in a situation where those in power 
(the healthcare practitioners) are playing God.
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